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Abstract. Security of Wireless sensor network (WSN) becomes a very 
important issue with the rapid development of WSN that is vulnerable to a wide 
range of attacks due to deployment in the hostile environment and having 
limited resources. Intrusion detection system is one of the major and efficient 
defensive methods against attacks in WSN. A particularly devastating attack is 
the sleep deprivation attack, where a malicious node forces legitimate nodes to 
waste their energy by resisting the sensor nodes from going into low power 
sleep mode. The goal of this attack is to maximize the power consumption of 
the target node, thereby decreasing its battery life. Existing works on sleep 
deprivation attack have mainly focused on mitigation using MAC based 
protocols, such as S-MAC, T-MAC, B-MAC, etc. In this article, a brief review 
of some of the recent intrusion detection systems in wireless sensor network 
environment is presented. Finally, we propose a framework of cluster based 
layered countermeasure that can efficiently mitigate sleep deprivation attack in 
WSN. Simulation results on MATLAB exhibit the effectiveness of the 
proposed model in detecting sleep-deprivation attacks. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Wireless sensor network (WSN) refers to a system that consists of number of low-cost, resource limited 
sensor nodes to sense important data related to environment and to transmit it to sink node that provides 
gateway functionality to another network, or an access point for human interface. WSN is a rapidly 
growing area as new technologies are emerging, new applications are being developed, such as traffic, 
environment monitoring, healthcare, military applications, home automation. WSN is vulnerable to various 
attacks such as jamming, battery drainage, routing cycle, sybil, cloning. Due to limitation of computation, 
memory and power resource of sensor nodes, complex security mechanism can not be implemented in 
WSN. Therefore energy-efficient security implementation is an important requirement for WSN.  
    A sleep deprivation attack (battery drainage) is a particularly severe attack in WSN because recharging or 
replacing node batteries in WSN may be impossible. In this type of attack, intruder forces the sensor nodes to 
remain awake; so that they waste their energy. This attack imposes such a large amount of energy 
consumption upon the limited power sensor nodes that they stop working and give rise to denial of service 
through denial of sleep. 
    In this paper a survey of on-going research activity is presented. This is followed by a comparative 
analysis of the recent ID schemes. This paper concludes with a glimpse of the proposed model for detecting 
sleep deprivation attack.  
 
 
 
 
2       Related Works 
 
Intrusion detection for WSN is an emerging field of research. This section presents a category-wise 
report of on-going research activities. 
Distributed Approach 
• In [1], a semantic based intrusion detection framework is proposed for WSN by using multi-agent and 
semantic based techniques, where security ontology is constructed according to the features of WSN to 
represent the formal semantics for intrusion detection. This distributed technique is based on cooperative 
mechanism. In this mechanism, each selected rule of security ontology is mapped to sensing data collected 
from common sensor nodes to detect anomaly. 
• In [2], an energy efficient learning solution for IDS in WSN has been proposed. This schema is based 
on the concept of stochastic learning automata on packet sampling mechanism. Simple Learning Automata 
based ID (S-LAID) functions in a distributed manner with each node functioning independently without 
any knowledge about the adjacent nodes. 
Hierarchical Approach 
• In [3], a location-aware, trust-based detection and isolation mechanism of compromised nodes in 
wireless sensor network is proposed. In this technique, probabilistic model is used to define trust and 
reputation. 
• In [4], a method using isolation table is proposed to isolate malicious nodes by avoiding consumption 
of unnecessary energy by IDS (ITIDS).This hierarchical structure of IDS based on cluster network can 
detect serious attacks such as hello flooding, denial of service (DoS), denial of sleep, sinkhole and 
wormhole attack. In this mechanism, malicious nodes can be detected by considering remaining energy and 
trust values of sensor nodes.  
• In [5], a lightweight ranger based IDS (RIDS) has been proposed. It combines the ranger method to 
reduce energy consumption and the isolation tables to avoid detecting anomaly repeatedly. This lightweight 
IDS model relates ontology concept mechanism about anomaly detection. In this technique, rough set 
theory (RST) is used for preprocessing of packets and anomaly models will be trained by support vector 
machine (SVM). 
• In [6], a hierarchical overlay design (HOD) based intrusion detection system is proposed, using policy 
based detection mechanism. This model follows core defense strategy where cluster-head is the centre point 
to defend intruder and concentrates on saving the power of sensor nodes by distributing the responsibility 
of intrusion detection to three layer nodes. 
• In [7], a Hybrid Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) has been proposed in heterogeneous cluster based 
WSN (CWSN).The attacks such as spoofed, altered, or replayed routing information, sinkhole, sybil, 
wormholes, acknowledgment spoofing, select forward, hello floods can be detected using this model. 
• In [8], a hierarchical model (three layer architecture) is proposed based on weighted trust evaluation 
(WTE) to detect malicious nodes by monitoring its reported data.  
• In [9], a dynamic model of intrusion detection (DIDS) has been proposed for WSN. This is a 
hierarchical model of IDS based on clustered network to battle the low energy. It can use distributed 
defense which has the advantage of detecting multiple intruders, albeit, with an increased rate of energy 
consumption with increase in cluster size. 
 
  
3     Comparative Analysis of Recent ID Schemes 
 
               Table 1.  STRENGTH, WEAKNESS and FUTURE SCOPE of EXISTING IDS 
 
Existing IDS          Strength    Weakness     Future Scope 
Semantic 
IDS[1] 
1) Agent node stores the whole 
ontology in its memory. 
2) Energy efficient  
1) Mapping of security 
ontology with sensor data is 
vague. 
2) Decision making function 
is not clearly specified. 
Algorithms can be 
improved by using more 
complex semantics of 
security ontology.             
Simple 
Learning 
Automata 
based IDS [2] 
1) Distributed nature avoids all 
other nodes being sacrificed when 
a single node is affected. 
2) Energy efficient 
3) Self-learning nature optimizes 
packet sampling efficiency. 
Computational complexity 
increases because of using 
dynamic topology by 
distributed self-learning 
automation technique.  
S-LAID solution can be 
tested in different 
application domains of 
sensor network.    
Location 
Aware Trust 
based IDS [3] 
1) Reputation-based monitoring 
facilitates detection and isolation 
of malicious nodes efficiently.  
2) Location awareness enhances 
integrity. 
Use of encryption algorithm 
consumes more energy. 
 
Location verification 
protocol can be 
extended. 
Isolation Table 
based IDS [4] 
 
Primary experiment proves that 
ITIDS can prevent attacks 
effectively in terms of live nodes 
and transmission accuracy. 
 
When the remaining nodes 
decrease, the intruders can 
penetrate WSN more easily.  
Anomaly detection 
technique can be 
extended for 
improvement.   
Ranger based 
IDS [5] 
1) Intruder can not attack WSN 
through isolated anomalous 
nodes. 
2) Lightweight model works in 
energy-efficient manner. 
 
It mainly focuses on Sybil 
attack. 
 
It can be implemented 
through standard 
protocols (e.g. Zigbee) 
for performance 
evaluation. 
Hierarchical 
Overlay Design 
based IDS [6] 
1) Reliability, efficiency and 
effectiveness are high for a large 
geographical area.  
2)  Distributed four level 
hierarchy results in highly energy 
saving structure. 
3) ID becomes very fast and 
effective.         
1) IDS needs to wait for 
intruders to reach the core 
area whereas nodes can be 
captured at any area without 
any notice.  
2) Total cost of network set 
up is increased for using 
policy based mechanism. 
Election procedure can 
be implemented; IDS 
scalability and definition 
of detection policy need 
to be determined, more 
specifically. 
Hybrid IDS [7] 1) Its detection rate and accuracy 
are high for using hybrid 
approach. Decision making model 
is very simple and fast. 
2) Cluster head is used to reduce 
energy consumption, amount of 
data in the entire network and to 
increase network lifetime. 
Rules in the anomaly 
detection model are defined 
manually, so performance 
can not be verified through 
simulation. 
 
Feature selection in 
anomaly detection can be 
done by data mining; 
Rule based approach can 
be extended to provide 
anomaly detection model 
with better performance 
and flexibility. 
Weighted Trust 
Evaluation 
based IDS [8] 
1) It detects misbehaved nodes 
accurately with very short delay. 
2) Light-weight algorithm incurs 
little overhead. 
It gives rise to high 
misdetection rate. 
More detailed analysis 
regarding the 
performance will be 
studied in the ongoing 
research. 
Dynamic 
Model of  IDS 
[9] 
1) It has remarkable improvement 
in security, stability and 
robustness as compared to static 
IDS. Distributed nature of this 
model increases security and 
network’s lifetime. 
2) Upgradation of defense 
structure increases flexibility. 
1) It needs more time to 
detect all intrusions. 
2) Distributed detection 
consumes more energy. 
It can be tested with real 
life applications to 
ensure perfectness of the 
model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                             Table 2.  Analysis of Some of the Recent IDS for WSN 
 
 
 
 
4     Proposed Model  
 
 Our objective is to detect the sleep deprivation attack in sensor network. In this section, a lightweight 
model, INSOMNIA MITIGATING INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM (IMIDS) is proposed for 
heterogeneous wireless sensor network (HWSNET) to detect insomnia of stationary sensor nodes. It uses 
cluster based mechanism in an energy efficient manner to build a five layer hierarchical network to enhance 
network scalability, flexibility and lifetime. The low energy constraints of WSN necessitate the use of a 
hierarchical model for IDS. We divide sensor network into clusters which are again partitioned into sectors. 
Intrusion 
Detection 
System 
                                   Featurewise  differences 
Node Density    Detection Rate     Energy consumption 
S-LAIDS [2] Node density 
medium. 
Penalty threshold of 0.2  
detects 63 to 71% malicious 
packets, that of 0.8 is able to 
detect 25 to 33% malicious 
packets. 
Both the reward and the 
penalty functions are 
calculated on basis of the 
residual energy. Removal of 
malicious node requires less 
energy. 
Location 
aware trust 
based IDS 
[3] 
Number of sensor nodes 
within 5 to 100 are 
deployed randomly in 
50 m2 area. 
 
Probability of compromised 
node detection is certain when 
the number of neighboring 
nodes is 15 or less. As the 
number of neighboring nodes 
increases, the probability of 
blacklisting decreases.  
No evaluation regarding 
energy consumption is found. 
ITIDS[ 4] 200 sensor nodes are 
deployed uniformly 
within 10000 square 
meters area. 
95% detection accuracy is 
achieved when number of 
monitor nodes equals to 100. 
Energy consumption is less for 
WSN having 50 nodes compared 
to 100 or 200 nodes.  
HIDS [7] Node density is not 
specified. 
 
 
99.81% detection rate, 0.57% 
phantom intrusion rate and 
99.75% accuracy are achieved. 
Individual detection rate is very 
low when the training sample is 
not substantial. 
Its energy consumption is very 
low. 
WTE based 
IDS [8] 
Number of nodes are 
within a range from 9 to 
900. It has high 
scalability. 
Detection is terminated after 
more than 25% of all nodes are 
detected as malicious nodes. 
Weight penalties values in the 
range of 0.04 -0.1 can improve 
detection rate with low 
misdetection rate. 
 
No evaluation regarding energy 
consumption is found. 
DIDS [ 9] 70 nodes within 
transmission range of 4 
to 15 m, having cluster 
size equals to 10 for the 
overall area  of 80m 
*100m. 
When number of nodes equals to 
20, all types of defenses can 
detect intrusion, but when 
number of nodes is greater than 
or equal to 40, only distributed 
defense can detect intrusion. 
DIDS detection rate is higher 
within smaller range (90% with 
a range of at least 15m). 
If consumed energy in any node 
is greater than or equal to 30% 
before activation of IDS, it can 
not be selected. Distributed 
defense results in high energy 
consumption. The lowest energy 
in DIDS is about 57%, which is 
17% higher than that in SIDS. 
DIDS can prolong the lifetime of 
network by 8% on average. 
It will minimize the energy consumption by avoiding all the nodes needing to send data to a distant sink 
node. It uses anomaly detection technique in such a way so that phantom intrusion detection can be avoided 
logically. 
 
 
4.1    Assumptions            
 
o A sensor can be in any one of the following states: 
              NEW→MEMBER→ SUSPECTED→MALICIOUS→ISOLATED 
                                      ↓            ↕                         ↓ 
                                     GENUINE    →        DEAD 
o Each sensor node has a unique id in the network. 
o Each member node has authentic wake-up token. 
o A protocol is used to assign a secure wakeup and sleep schedule for the sensor nodes. 
o Sink node is honest gateway to another network.  
o The threshold values are pre-calculated and set for the entire network. 
o If any of cluster coordinator, forwarding sector head, sector monitor or sector coordinator is found to 
be compromised, reconfiguration procedure takes place dynamically.  
o Sensor nodes excluding leaf nodes and forwarding sector heads in the system participate in intrusion 
detection process.  
o Generally, sector coordinator is responsible for anomaly detection and sector monitor is responsible for  
detection of intrusion. 
o Initially, probability of sleeping schedule and wake-up schedule are same (p=0.5) for any normal node. 
o Initially, trust value of each node is represented by a nibble t3 t2 t1 t0 containing all 1’s, belief is set to 1. 
o SM may be more than one within a sector. 
o SN selects CC and CC selects SC, SM, FSH. 
o Anomaly can be detected on the basis of energy consumption rate, allotted wakeup schedule, authentic 
wakeup token, number of packets received within a time interval. Reputation of sensor node needs to 
be considered during intrusion detection. 
 
               
               4.2    Data Definition 
 
 ▪ Definition 1: Leaf Node LN– A node N is defined to be a Leaf Node if ChildN{ }= {∅} AND ParentN { } 
≠ {∅}. Its detection power(DP) ←0. 
              ▪ Definition 2: Setor Coordinator SC – A node N is defined to be a Sector Coordinator if Rem_engN = 
MAX_ENG {FN[ ]}, where FN[] → follower nodes.  
              ▪ Definition 3: Setor Monitor SM - A node N is defined to be a Sector Monitor if DPN =MAX_DETECT        
{N [ ]}, where N∉ {CCk, SN} AND DPN→ power required by a node for intrusion detection.  
              ▪ Definition 4: Forwarding Sector Head FSH - A node N is defined to be a Forwarding Sector Head, where 
hop_distanceN {} = min{hop_ distanceN  from CCk},where N ∉CCk. Its detection power (DP) ←0.           
▪ Definition 5: Cluster Coordinator CC - A node N is defined to be a Cluster Coordinator, if Rem_engN = 
MAX_ENG{N[ ]}AND CAPACITYN=MAX(CAPACITYN),where N∉SN AND CAPACITYN = 
(DEGREEN/ INITIAL_ENGN)*Rem_EngN, DEGREEN→number of nodes within its radio range. 
              ▪ Definition 6: Sink Node SN - A node N is defined to be a Sink Node if ChildN { } ≠ {∅} AND ParentN { } 
= {∅}.  
 
 
4.3    System Model 
 
 Figure 1 describes the main building block of the system model. Here SN−> SINK NODE; 
CC−>CLUSTER COORDINATOR; SM−>SECTOR MONITOR; FSH−>FORWARDING SECTOR 
HEAD; SC−>SECTOR COORDINATOR; LN−> LEAF NODE;  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    Fig. 1.    Layered Model  
 
 
4.3.1 Description of Each Layer  
 
The five layers of sensor network are described below- 
Ø Layer 1: In this lowest layer leaf nodes sense environmental data and send it to its immediate next   
   higher layer i.e. layer 2. Layer 1 has no anomaly detection capacity. 
Ø Layer 2: This layer includes sector coordinator (SC) of each sector that collects data from layer 1 and 
checks for anomaly. Sector coordinator maintains membership list [] of all leaf nodes within a sector, 
normal profile [] (tuple space that consists of sensor node’s attribute) and knowledge base [] (system 
parameters, application requirements). Suspected nodes are penalized and legitimate nodes are 
rewarded by SC. Reputation list [] is updated. Suspected node details are inserted in suspected list [] 
before forwarding to SM and valid packets are forwarded to FSH of layer 3.  
Ø Layer 3: This layer includes sector monitor(SM) and forwarding sector head (FSH). Sector monitor   
   maintains suspected list [], normal profile [], knowledge base [], reputation list []. SM can detect   
   intruders, compromised nodes and isolate them by inserting the details into quarantine list [] and  
   forwards the information to cluster coordinator (CC).FSH (nearest neighbor of cluster coordinator)     
   acts as router that inserts valid packet details to forwarding table [] and forwards valid packet of   
   legitimate nodes to CC of  layer 4. 
Ø Layer 4: This layer constitutes the cluster coordinator (CC) which controls SM and FSH of each   
   Sector within a cluster. It inserts valid packets details to valid list [] and forwards data to the sink      
   node. Cluster coordinators (CC) can cooperate with each other to form global IDS.CC contains    
   backup copy of its own cluster. 
Ø Layer 5: The topmost layer is the sink node that collects data from lower layer and it acts as a gateway 
between sensor network and other networks or acts as access point. SN contains backup copies of all 
clusters. 
 
4.3.2        IMIDS : Insomnia Mitigating Intrusion Detection System 
 
   The entire heterogeneous sensor field is divided into overlapping or disjoint clusters like Ck, for k ∈    
{1,..,r}, r being the number of clusters in the sensor network. Each cluster consists of its member nodes  
including a cluster coordinator (CC). Let mem1, mem2, ....,memn be the members of a cluster Ck, which are 
unaware of their locations and n is the number of members within a cluster excluding CC. Clusters are 
partitioned into non-overlapping sectors like Sj, for j∈{1,…,m},where m is the number of sectors within a 
cluster, where r<<m . We assume three types of sensor nodes in this five layered model: (i) leader nodes or  
LDN (in layer 3 and 4) (ii) follower nodes or FN (in layer 1 and 2) and (iii) sink node or SN (in layer 5). 
Leader nodes can be equipped with EXIDS (extended IDS), but only the node designated as sector monitor 
can activate it. Cluster coordinator (CC) and sink nodes (SN) are also using EXIDS for detecting intrusion 
during its requirement. SIDS (simple IDS) can be loaded in all follower nodes, but can be activated only at 
sector coordinator of layer 2 for detecting anomaly. Sector coordinator collects sensing data within allotted 
TDMA time slot of each leaf node in a sector. Sector coordinator (SC) monitors the sensor nodes for 
detecting anomaly by SIDS. Suspected nodes are penalized and legitimate nodes are rewarded. Forwarding 
sector head (FSH) forwards valid packets to CC. Sector monitor (SM) decides whether a suspected node is 
malicious or not. EXIDS has the responsibility to declare the suspected node as malicious and to drop fake 
or corrupted packets. To avoid phantom intrusion detection logically, suspected nodes get chance to 
increase their reputation by SM, if it is not decided as malicious. Intruder/Malicious nodes are isolated in 
quarantine list; so that no intrusion occurs through these nodes. 
 If HWSNET is considered as a graph G (V, E), any edge E between two nodes ni and nj is valid if and 
only if distance between two nodes Di,j <= Rtr (transmission range).Detection power of LN and FSH are 0%, 
SC,CC,SN are 50% and SM is 80%.When detection power reaches to minimum threshold, detection 
capacity is automatically disabled. Reconfiguration procedure takes place dynamically if any node found to 
be suspected i.e. energy consumption rate greater than normal consumption rate. Each of leader and 
follower nodes must be included within a cluster. If any node is under more than one CC then RSSI value 
need to be checked. If there is a tie, it is broken randomly. Anomaly is detected by SC. But there is a 
possibility of false positive or false negative. If any genuine node is suspected by SC (false positive), SM 
can detect it and takes final decision. If any compromised node is treated as genuine and forwarded to FSH 
(false negative), CC can detect it.  
 
 
 
 
 
                               Fig. 2. Cluster Based Heterogeneous Sensor Network  
 
 
 
 
  4.3.3       Procedural Steps of IMIDS 
 
§ Initialization Phase: 
   Sensor nodes are deployed in the sensor field during this phase. A unique identification number    
   consisting of the geographical position vectors is assigned to each new node. The sink node searches  
   for its neighbors to acquire energy details of all nodes after broadcasting advertised message. 
§ Cluster Coordinator Selection and Cluster Formation Phase:  
   Cluster coordinator is selected among all leader nodes and its coverage area is considered as cluster.    
   The Cluster-head details are broadcasted to all its neighbors. The neighbor nodes collect advertised   
   messages during a given time interval and send a join message to nearest cluster coordinator for all  
   nodes within the range of any specific cluster coordinator. Intersection of two cluster domains may or   
   may not be NULL. 
§ Sector Coordinator Selection and Sector Formation Phase:  
   Sector coordinator is selected among all follower nodes and its detailed information along with    
   node-id is broadcasted to all of its neighbors. Its coverage area is considered as sector. Intersection   
   of domains of two sectors must be NULL. Sector monitors and forwarding sector heads are selected  
   for each sector.  
§ IDS Activation Phase: 
       Activate IDS preinstalled in cluster coordinators, sector monitors and sector coordinators.  
§ Reconfiguration Phase: 
   When cluster coordinator or sector coordinator’s behavior deviates from normal, reconfiguration  
    procedure takes place. 
§ Data Transfer and Intrusion Detection Phase:  
   After sector coordinator selection is done each follower node (leaf node) sends data to the sector  
   coordinator that transfers genuine packet  to its cluster coordinator through forwarding sector head.  
   Cluster coordinator collects valid data from all sectors within its coverage area and then forwards  
   aggregated packets to sink node.  
 
 
 4.3.4     Selection Procedure 
 
(i) Sink node broadcasts its node-id and query message to acquire current residual energy of each   
    sensor node within its coverage area. 
(ii) According to response from sensor nodes, sink node categorized sensor nodes into leader nodes  
 having high energy and follower nodes having comparatively low energy. 
(iii)Leader node having minimum distance from sink node, maximum residual energy among all other   
  leader nodes and high reputation, is selected as cluster coordinator. 
(iv) Remaining leader nodes within a cluster having high detection power is selected as sector monitor,  
  whereas leader nodes having minimum distance from cluster coordinator is selected as forwarding  
  sector head. 
(v)  Follower nodes having maximum energy among all follower nodes are selected as sector   
  coordinator, other follower nodes are considered as leaf nodes. 
 
  
5   Performance Analysis 
 
    In this section, we validate our analysis using simulation in MATLAB. Performance has been studied   
by simulating sensor nodes in the existing ITIDS and proposed IMIDS. In figure 3, the result of the 
simulation shows that number of alive nodes with respect to increasing time in second is more in IMIDS. 
Therefore it can be said that HWSNET lifetime is better by using IMIDS than ITIDS. Because IMIDS uses 
dynamic configuration and cluster is further partitioned into sectors. In figure 4, the result shows that 
accuracy is comparatively high in IMIDS because here sector monitors which have high detection power 
are used to detect intrusion; whereas in ITIDS low energy member nodes are considered as monitor nodes. 
In figure 5, energy consumption is compared with respect to the density of sensor nodes with clusterization 
and sectorization and without clusterization or sectorization. The result of simulation shows energy 
consumption is comparatively less when sensor field is partitioned into clusters and sectors. After analyzing 
performance, it can be said that proposed IMIDS can prolong network lifetime, detect intrusion accurately 
and consumes less energy to mitigate sleep deprivation attack. 
 
 
        
                     
                       Fig. 3. Comparison of the number of alive nodes between ITIDS and IMIDS 
 
 
     
                      
                       
                        Fig. 4. Comparison of the accuracy between ITIDS and IMIDS 
 
 
 
                  
        
                 Fig. 5.   Energy consumption with sectorization and without sectorization in IMIDS 
 
 
 
 
6  Conclusion 
 
      In this paper, we present a review of recent works on different approaches of IDS for WSN. It has been   
observed that these intrusion detection systems are not adequate for protecting WSN from intruders 
efficiently. The need of the day is an IDS for detecting intrusions accurately in an energy-efficient manner. 
Among the different types of prevalent attacks, sleep deprivation attack at link layer has been found to be 
the most devastating one for sensor nodes, exhausting the battery life very quickly. This paper comes up 
with the idea of a novel IDS that can mitigate sleep deprivation attack without using MAC based protocols 
like S-MAC, T-MAC, B-MAC, G-MAC. The outline of layer based approach using cluster technique to 
design a lightweight IDS capable of detecting insomnia of sensor nodes with less energy consumption has 
been documented here. The aim of this proposed model is to extend the lifetime of the WSN, even in the 
face of sleep deprivation attack. Generally, intruder attacks lower layer leaf nodes in HWSNET. In this 
model, intrusion detection is mainly focused on layer 1 that has no intrusion detection capacity of its own. 
Simulation proves the effectiveness of proposed model. At present work is on for more detailed analysis 
of IMIDS in a simulated environment. 
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